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What Role for Humanitarian Intellectual 
Property?  The Globalization of Intellectual 
Property Rights 
Susan K. Sell* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Globalization of intellectual property rights poses new 
challenges in fields ranging from medicine to agriculture.  The 
dramatic expansion of intellectual property rights threatens 
reduced access to life-saving medicines and essential crops. 
Even though promising advances in biotechnology may 
enhance the nutritional content of basic crops, access to those 
critical developments is endangered by current regulatory 
trends.  
The 1995 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), administered by the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), is the most important 
international law governing intellectual property rights.1  
TRIPS extends patent rights to a wide variety of agricultural 
biotechnology innovations, including pharmaceutical products, 
pesticides, and plant varieties.2  It establishes a twenty-year 
patent term for these innovations.3  TRIPS requires states to 
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 1. See Peter Drahos & John Braithwaite, Intellectual Property, Corporate 
Strategy, Globalisation: Trips in Context, 20 WIS. INT’L L.J. 451, 451 (2002). 
 2. See United Nations Council on Trade and Development- International 
Center for Trade and Sustainable Development Project on Intellectual 
Property Rights and Sustainable Development, Intellectual Property Rights: 
Implications for Development 77 (2003) [hereinafter UNCTAD-ICTSD Project 
on Intellectual Property Rights] (summarizing biotechnology patent protection 
under TRIPS Article 27.3(b)), available at 
http://www.ictsd.org/pubs/ictsd_series/iprs/PP/PP_3CH_07.pdf; SUSAN K. 
SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 8 (2003). 
 3. Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
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provide adequate and effective enforcement mechanisms both 
internally and at their borders.4  The price of information and 
technology is increased under TRIPS because monopoly 
privileges are extended to patent-holders and TRIPS makes 
WTO dispute settlement procedures available to patent holders 
claiming violation of intellectually property rights.5  If a 
complaining government is successful in its claim, the WTO 
can authorize trade sanctions against the violating state.6  
These settlement procedures and powers to punish make 
TRIPS a real force in the world. 
Intellectual property rights reflect an inherent tension 
between the strong desire to promote and reward creative 
energy and the desire to make the fruits of that creativity 
available to the public.7  The granting of exclusive rights must 
be balanced against the economic effects of higher product and 
transaction costs8 and the potential “exclusion from the market 
of competitors who may be able to imitate or adapt the 
invention in such a way that social value is increased.”9  Thus, 
the question is whether intellectual property rights should be 
treated as “a public goods problem for which the remedy is 
commodification, or a monopoly of information problem for 
which the remedy is unfettered competition[?]”10 
Strong intellectual property protection is justified by a 
market approach, because such protection provides incentives 
to “increase the number of commercially available products and 
thereby serve the public interest.”11  However, it is important 
to question which public interests these rights serve.  In the 
context of agricultural biotechnology, stakeholders include 
                                                                                                                            
April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1C; LEGAL INSTRUMENTS- RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY 
ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 
2004).  
 4. See SELL, supra note 2, at 9. 
 5. See id. 
 6. See id. 
 7. See id. at 15. 
 8. See id. 
 9. See id. at 15 (citing MICHAEL TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE 
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 250 (1995)). 
 10. James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, 
Blackmail, and Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1413, 1450 (1992). 
 11. Risa L. Lieberwitz, The Marketing of Higher Education: The Price of 
the University’s Soul, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 763, 782 (2004) (reviewing DEREK 
BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF 
HIGHER EDUCATION (2003)). 
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private sector seed companies, public corporations, research 
institutions, and resource-poor farmers.12  Intellectual property 
rights holders benefit from exclusive control of their 
innovations, as do those who have the resources to gain access 
to these innovations via the commercial market.  Yet market-
based solutions have failed to serve marginalized populations, 
such as the millions of people afflicted with HIV/AIDS and 
smallholder subsistence farmers in developing countries. The 
fact that smallholder farmers account for seventy-five percent 
of the world’s undernourished population is evidence of this 
failure.13  In contemporary life science industries, market 
mechanisms fail to deliver innovation into the public domain.14  
Indeed, “[i]nternational markets for technologies are inherently 
subject to failure due to distortions attributable to concerns 
about appropriability, problems of valuing information by 
buyers and sellers, and market power, all strong justifications 
for public intervention at both the domestic and global levels.”15  
There is a great need to strike a balance between a patent-
holder’s exclusive rights and the provision of agricultural 
technology to marginalized populations throughout the world.  
Solutions that will maximize the benefit of protecting 
innovation and yet minimize the risk of harm created by the 
potential overextension of this protection must be explored.  It 
is therefore essential that policymakers consider 
“humanitarian” policies that promote social goals, such as 
protecting public health and alleviating malnutrition. 
This paper addresses the appropriateness of patent 
protection for agricultural innovations which could provide 
extensive benefits to marginalized populations if placed in the 
public domain.  First, it places global intellectual property 
rights into a broader structural context and discusses a number 
of issues present in the expansion of agricultural intellectual 
                                                          
 12. Cf. UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on Intellectual Property Rights, supra 
note 2, at 107-08 (discussing the rights of plant breeders and the interests of 
farmers). 
 13. See Robert Lettington, Small-scale Agriculture and the Nutritional 
Safeguard under Article 8(1) of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: Case Studies from Kenya and 
Peru, UNCTAD-ICTSD, Capacity Building Project on Intellectual Property 
Rights and Sustainable Development 7 (Draft November 2003), available at 
http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/docs/lettingtonfinaldraft.pdf. 
 14. See Keith E. Maskus and Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of 
Private Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, 7 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 279 (2004).   
 15. Id. at 288.   
 194 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 6:1 
 
property protection.  Second, it focuses on conflicts between 
commercial breeders and smallholder subsistence farmers.  The 
article then examines the current framework of the 
international intellectual property rights regime, including a 
discussion of TRIPS and The International Convention for the 
Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV), bilateral and 
regional free trade agreements, and the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980.  
The discussion next reflects upon the changing role of land 
grant universities in transferring the benefits of agricultural 
technology.  Finally, this paper concludes with policy options 
for the future. 
  II. STRUCTURAL DIMENSIONS 
The contemporary global intellectual property regime is 
embedded in a broad structural context characterized by 
asymmetrical power relationships.16  Over the past thirty 
years, the globalization of financial markets and the shift 
towards an unfettered faith in laissez faire markets ideology 
pursued by the Reagan and Thatcher administrations has 
resulted in an increase in corporate transnational power vis-à-
vis the state.17  States, seeking to be globally competitive, have 
liberalized markets, engaged in deregulation and privatization, 
and implemented new regulatory structures designed to 
promote efficiency and enforce market-friendly behavior.18  
According to Philip Cerny, “[t]he institutions and practices of 
the state itself are increasingly marketized or ‘commodified,’ 
and the state becomes the spearhead of structural 
transformation to international market norms both at home 
and abroad.”19  States have increasingly privatized once-public 
services, such as prisons, hospitals, military support services 
and even “mission-critical” functions, such as providing 
protection for the head of the 2003 Coalition Provisional 
Authority in Iraq, L. Paul Bremer III.  The expansion of 
intellectual property rights and the privatization of federally 
funded research under the Bayh-Dole Act must be seen as an 
instance of this larger trend.20 
                                                          
 16. See SELL, supra note 2, at 17. 
 17. Id. at 19. 
 18. Cf. id. at 19-20. 
 19. Philip Cerny, Political Globalization and the Competition State, in 
POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE CHANGING GLOBAL ORDER 300, 304 (Richard 
Stubbs & Geoffrey Underhill eds., 2nd. ed. 2000). 
 20. 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2001). The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 permits 
universities to patent inventions resulting from federally funded research. 
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These broad economic changes have profoundly affected 
developing countries. Earlier models of economic development 
such as import-substituting industrialization, popular in Latin 
America and India, were discredited by economic stagnation 
and the debt crises of the 1970s-1980s.21  Meanwhile, the 
success of the East Asian “Tigers” vindicated export-led 
development and integration into global markets.22  Many 
developing countries subsequently reversed decades-old policies 
of economic nationalism in favor of market liberalization and 
privatization and consequently slashed public budgets.23  
Governments in developing countries began to compete to 
attract foreign investment and eased former restrictions of 
foreign investors’ activities.24  The new push toward export-led 
growth meant that developing countries needed access to 
industrialized country markets.25  The dependence of 
developing nations on trade gave the United States 
considerable economic leverage.26  Those developing countries 
sought access to the expansive United States market.27  Using 
the U.S. Trade Act of 1974,28 the Office of the United States 
Trade Representative, at the behest of high-technology firms, 
threatened trade sanctions against developing countries unless 
they adopted and enforced highly protective intellectual 
property policies.29  Such economic coercion was an important 
factor behind developing countries’ ultimate acceptance of 
TRIPS.30 
This liberalizing agenda favors “finance capital and other 
mobile factors of production.”31  Transnational firms in 
knowledge-intensive sectors such as pharmaceuticals, 
                                                          
 21. See Thomas Biersteker, The “Triumph” of Neo-classical Economics in 
the Developing World: Policy Convergence and Bases of Governance in the 
International Economic Order, in GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: 
ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS 102, 121-22 (James Rosenau & Otto 
Czempiel eds., 1992). 
 22. Id.  
  23 . See generally id. at 105-07, 121-26. 
  24.  See generally id. 
  25 . See generally id. 
  26 . See generally id. 
  27. See Biersteker, supra note 21 at 105-07, 121-26.  
 28. See 19 U.S.C § 2411 (1999). 
 29. See SELL, supra note 2, at 87-94. 
 30. See id. at 9, 87-94, 109-11. 
 31. Andrew Baker, Globalization and the British ‘Residual State’, in 
POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE CHANGING GLOBAL ORDER 362, 363-64 (Richard 
Stubbs & Geoffrey R.D. Underhill eds., 2nd ed. 2000). 
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chemicals, software, and entertainment “have the resources, 
motivations and capabilities to roam the world searching for 
the kind of opportunities that promise lucrative rewards.”32  
These privileged sectors participate in “globalized” markets 
insofar as “there are a small number of participants who know 
one another and operate across countries with a common 
conception of control.”33  TRIPS reflects the wishes of these 
privileged sectors and globalizes their preferred conception of 
control by establishing a high level of protection. 
Beyond extending property rights, competitiveness 
concerns moved the United States to relax its antitrust 
policies.34  The Reagan administration codified this approach in 
the Antitrust Division’s Merger Control Guidelines of 1982.35  
Reflecting the influence of the Chicago School of Economics, the 
new guidelines abandoned the populist focus on market 
structure in favor of the Chicago school’s focus on price 
theory.36  “In this view, only business practices that reduce 
output and increase prices are anti-competitive; business 
practices that expand output are pro-competitive.”37  In 
contrast to earlier approaches, according to the Chicago school, 
“[h]igh levels of market concentration and the exercise of 
market power may be indicative of efficiencies.”38  The 1982 
guidelines presented an expanded definition of relevant 
markets. The guidelines allowed the introduction of non-
structural factors, such as foreign competition or the possession 
of new technology that was important to long-term 
competitiveness.39  The Justice Department argued that “anti-
trust laws should not be applied in a way that hinders the 
renewed emphasis on . . . competitiveness.”40 
This new thinking removed most intellectual property 
licensing from antitrust scrutiny.  As Thomas Hayslett points 
                                                          
 32. Randall Germain, Globalization in Historical Perspective, in 
GLOBALIZATION AND ITS CRITICS 67, 81 (Randall D. Germain ed., 2000). 
 33. Neil Fligstein, Markets as Politics: A Political-Cultural Approach to 
Market Institutions, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 656, 663 (1996). 
 34. See SELL, supra note 2, at 72-74. 
 35. See SUSAN K. SELL, POWER AND IDEAS 159 (1998). 
 36. See id. at 158. 
 37. Id. 
 38. MARC EISNER, ANTITRUST AND THE TRIUMPH OF ECONOMICS 105 
(1991). 
 39. See id. at 198. 
 40. PAUL S. HOFF, INVENTIONS IN THE MARKETPLACE: PATENT LICENSING 
AND THE U.S. ANTITRUST LAWS 19 (1986). 
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out, under Reagan’s administration, “executive agencies viewed 
the economic incentives provided by intellectual property rights 
as legitimate means of extracting the full economic benefit from 
innovation.”41  In effect then, “[i]ntellectual property rights 
acted as a ‘magic trump card’ allowing many previously suspect 
arrangements to proceed without challenge from the [Federal 
Trade Commission] or [Department of Justice].”42  Keith 
Maskus and Jerome Reichman suggest that today: 
There are virtually no products sold on the general products market 
that do not come freighted with a bewildering and overlapping array 
of exclusive property rights that discourage follow-on applications of 
routine technical know-how. Weak enforcement of antitrust laws then 
further reinforces the barriers to entry erected upon this thicket of 
rights, while the need to stimulate and coordinate investment in 
complex innovation projects justifies patent pools, concentrations of 
research efforts, and predatory practices formerly thought to 
constitute misuses of the patent monopoly.43 
So-called patent “thickets” have proliferated, in which 
overlapping patent rights require those seeking to 
commercialize new technology to obtain licenses from multiple 
patent holders.44  “A growing thicket of rights surrounds gene 
fragments, research tools, and other upstream inputs of 
scientific research, and the resulting transaction costs impede 
and delay research and development undertaken in both the 
public and private sectors.”45 
III. ISSUES IN AGRICULTURE 
What are the implications of the foregoing for agriculture? 
“Increasingly . . . [intellectual property] rights have invaded the 
research commons itself and made it both costly and difficult to 
obtain cutting-edge technologies needed for public health, 
agricultural production, environmental protection, and the 
provision of other public goods.”46  Critics of the increasing 
commodification of what was once treated as the public domain 
                                                          
 41. Thomas L. Hayslett III, 1995 Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of 
Intellectual Property: Harmonizing the Commercial Use of Legal Monopolies 
with the Prohibitions of Antitrust Law, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 375, 382 (1996). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Maskus and Reichman, supra note 14, at 297.   
 44. Michael A. Carrier, Resolving the Patent-Antitrust Paradox Through 
Tripartite Innovation, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1047, 1090-91 (2003). 
 45. Maskus and Reichman, supra note 14, at 298.  See also Arti K. Rai & 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Public Domain: Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress 
of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289 (2003). 
 46.  Maskus and Reichman, supra note 14, at 303-04.   
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have raised at least six issues of concern: (1) threats to 
traditional agriculture and food security; (2) abuses of 
monopoly power; (3) increased dependence on costly 
commercial agriculture; (4) threats to biodiversity; (5) 
“biopiracy;” and (6) questions of benefit sharing.47  The 
discussion in this article focuses on the first three issues of 
concern.   
Technological, judicial, and legislative changes together 
have produced a radical shift from public to private provision of 
seeds.  As Professor Keith Aoki points out, “[t]he private seed 
market for grains was almost nonexistent at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, due to free government seed distribution 
and the widespread practice of farmer seed saving.”48  
According to Professor Aoki, “the intersection of biotechnical 
knowledge and methods and expanded legal protections for 
plant breeders transforms seed germplasm into a paradigm 
commodity.”49  Legislative changes, including the United States 
Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970,50 “increased expectations 
of seed industry profits and thereby helped to stimulate an 
upsurge in mergers and acquisitions . . . .”51  Life sciences 
corporations “emerged out of a wave of mergers, acquisitions, 
joint ventures and strategic partnerships involving companies 
in a wide range of fields such as chemicals, seeds, processed 
foods, dietary supplements and pharmaceuticals.”52  Advances 
in biotechnology spurred the consolidation process throughout 
the 1970s and particularly in the 1980s.53  The 1973 
development of the recombinant DNA technique, “which 
enabled foreign genes to be inserted into microorganisms,” 
helped launch the era of commercial biotechnology.54  Notably, 
although “the Cohen-Boyer method for combining DNA from 
different organisms” was patented, “the patents were licensed 
nonexclusively and cheaply to encourage firms to take licenses 
rather than to challenge the patents.”55  This technology had 
                                                          
 47. See, e.g., Lettington, supra note 13, at 33-37. 
 48. Keith Aoki, Weeds, Seeds & Deeds: Recent Skirmishes in the Seed 
Wars, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 247, 268-69 (2003). 
 49. Id. at 261. 
 50. Plant Variety Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (1970). 
 51. GRAHAM DUTFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE LIFE 
SCIENCES INDUSTRIES 149 (2003). 
 52. Id. at 147-48. 
 53. Id. at 148. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Rai and Eisenberg, supra note 45, at 300. 
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been federally funded, and “[m]any observers attribute the 
rapid progress of the biotechnology industry to the fact that 
this technology was made widely available rather than licensed 
exclusively to a single firm.”56  In 1980, the U.S. Supreme 
Court ruled in Diamond v. Chakrabarty57  that a man-made, 
oil-eating bacterium could be patented.  This case led to the 
expansion of rights to own living organisms and injected 
greater certainty into the development of commercial 
biotechnology.  The ability to acquire patents on altered life 
forms helped biotechnology startup companies to raise venture 
capital. 
The combination of expanded intellectual property rights 
and relaxed antitrust enforcement has led to marked economic 
concentration in the life sciences industries.  The “vertical 
integration” of plant breeding, agrochemical, and food 
processing corporations has led to a situation in which the top 
ten seed companies control thirty percent of the world’s $23 
billion commercial seed market.58  Corporate plant breeders are 
obtaining broad patents that will have “far reaching” 
consequences.59  “Breeders are patenting entire species (cotton), 
economic characteristics (oil quality), plant reproductive 
behaviour (apomixes), and basic techniques in biotechnology 
(gene transfer tools).”60  Six major industrial groups now 
control most of the technology “‘which gives freedom to 
undertake commercial research and development in the area of 
[genetically modified] crops.’  These are (i) Agrevo and Plant 
Genetic Systems (PGS); (ii) Du Pont and Pioneer; (iii) ELM, 
DNAP, Asgrow and Seminis; (iv) Monsanto, Calgene, DeKalb, 
Agracetus, PBI, Hybritech and Delta and Pine Land Co.; (v) 
Novartis; and (vi) Zeneca, Mogen and Avanta.”61  Furthermore, 
six agricultural biotechnology companies alone hold seventy-
five percent of all U.S. patents granted to the top thirty patent-
holding firms: Monsanto, Du Pont, Syngenta, Dow, Aventis, 
and Grupo Pulsar.62  This combination of economic 
                                                          
 56. Id. 
 57. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308-18 (1980). 
 58. GAIA/GRAIN (Genetic Resources Action Council), Intellectual 
Property Rights and Biodiversity: The Economic Myths, § 4.2 (1998) 
[hereinafter GAIA/GRAIN, Intellectual Property Rights and Biodiversity], at 
http://www.grain.org/briefings/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2004).  
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. DUTFIELD, supra note 51, at 170. 
 62. Id. at 154. 
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concentration with extensive and broad patenting means that a 
handful of global corporations are making huge inroads toward 
control of the world’s food supply and are entangling farmers 
and indigenous peoples in an increasingly complex web of 
licensing and royalty obligations.  As Keith Maskus and 
Jerome Reichman suggest: 
[T]he natural competitive disadvantages of follower countries may 
become reinforced by a proliferation of legal monopolies and related 
entry barriers that result from global minimum [intellectual 
property] standards.  Such external restraints on competition could 
consign the poorest countries to a quasi-permanent status at the 
bottom of the technology and growth ladder.63 
The current system skews research towards rich and 
middle-income countries’ markets and sectors.64  Most notably, 
there is a tendency in the public health sector to neglect 
tropical diseases in favor of focusing on cancer and so-called 
lifestyle afflictions, requiring drugs to combat obesity, balding, 
and erectile dysfunction.  Consequently, only thirteen of 1,233 
new drugs marketed between 1975 and 1997 were approved for 
tropical diseases in particular.65  As Professor Hammer 
suggests, “the rhetoric of strong intellectual property rights 
leading to innovation that meets social needs rings particularly 
hollow” for poorer countries most afflicted by tropical 
diseases.66  Similarly, there is a focus on the interests of 
higher-income markets in the agriculture sector, resulting in 
the development of crops unsuitable for subsistence and 
smallholder farming and a dearth of research beneficial for less 
lucrative micro-climates.67   The disproportionate emphasis on 
wealthier countries’ market needs can be corrected through 
changes in private-public collaboration and through the 
allocation of more funding towards “the goal of helping 
subsistence farmers.”68  Historically, seed companies preferred 
to develop hybrids because farmers must purchase new hybrid 
seed every planting season.69  Since the offspring of hybrid 
plants do not breed true-to-type, hybrid seeds offer a “form of 
                                                          
 63. Maskus and Reichman, supra note 14, at 282.   
 64. See Lettington, supra note 13, at 51. 
 65. Peter F. Hammer, Differential Pricing of Essential AIDS Drugs: 
Markets, Politics, and Public Health, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 883, 888 (2002). 
 66. Id. 
 67. See Lettington, supra note 13, at 50-51. 
 68. John H. Barton, Nutrition and Technology Transfer Policies, 
UNCTAD/ICTSD Project on Intellectual Property Rights and Sustainable 
Development 14-15 (2003), at http://www.iprsonline. 
 69. UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 2, at 107. 
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biological protection.”70  However, for plant varieties that lack 
this built-in biological protection, plant breeders can appeal to 
plant breeders’ rights.  Plant breeders’ rights “generally do not 
encourage breeding related to minor crops with small 
markets.”71  As a result, the private sector under invests in 
crops and technologies suitable for smallholder farmers, and 
these public goods are underprovided. 
With the advent of genetic engineering, plant breeders 
sought to safeguard their investments through strong patent 
protections.  Depending on national law, patents may be 
available for “the use of the new gene to transform a plant, on 
the transformation process, and most significantly on the 
transformed plant itself.”72  The protection of transgenic plants 
enables genetic engineering firms to have “more confidence in 
their ability to reap the fruits of their research.”73  That is 
because transfer or insertion of the patented gene into other 
plants constitutes patent infringement.74  Before the adoption 
of the 1991 Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 
(UPOV91), plant breeders were forced to choose to protect their 
plant varieties with either a plant breeders’ right or a patent.  
However, UPOV91 “removed the 1978 [UPOV’s] ban on dual 
protection and now permits member states to protect the same 
plant variety with both a breeders’ right and a patent.”75  
Professor Robert Lettington argues that this expansion of 
intellectual property rights into the agricultural sector has 
threatened the public sector’s traditional focus on the needs of 
smallholder farmers.76  First of all, “private sector intellectual 
property rights may limit public sector access to innovations 
and germplasm that may be adaptable to smallholder needs 
and conditions while also limiting public sector research 
options due to concerns over the unhindered distribution of the 
products of its research.”77  Second, the “failure of intellectual 
property systems to preserve the integrity of the public domain, 
                                                          
 70. Barton, supra note 68, at 10. 
 71. UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 2, at 106. 
 72. Barton, supra note 68, at 11. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Laurence R. Helfer, Intellectual Property Rights in Plant Varieties: An 
Overview With Options for National Governments 15, (FAO Legal Papers 
Online No. 31, 2002), at http://www.fao.org/Legal/prs-ol/lpo31-2.pdf (emphasis 
added). 
 76. Lettington, supra note 13, at 8. 
 77. Id. 
 202 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 6:1 
 
and the consequent development of intellectual property rights 
strategies in public institutions, risks distorting research 
priorities to the detriment of smallholder farmers.”78 
In developing countries, a large number of farmers are 
smallholders who do not participate in the transgenic seed 
market in any substantial way.79  Instead, these farmers 
engage in seed-saving, replanting, and “across-the-fence” 
exchange.80  This is particularly the case in many African 
countries where the public and private sectors play a minimal 
role in seed production and distribution.81  The smallholder 
farming sector plays an important role in contributing to 
national food needs.  For example, such farmers produce “fifty-
one percent of Latin America’s maize, seventy-seven percent of 
its beans and sixty-one percent of its potatoes.”82  In Africa, 
smallholder farmers produce the “majority of grains and 
legumes and almost all root, tuber and plantain crops.”83 
Furthermore, fifty to sixty percent of Peruvians and seventy to 
eighty percent of Kenyans depend on smallholder agriculture 
for their livelihood. 84 
According to Professor Lettington, subsistence farmers 
traditionally save seeds for reuse, trade, and experimentation 
with new hybrids.85  Such experimentation contributes to the 
planet’s biodiversity, as evidenced by the farmers in Professor 
Lettington’s study who produced “as many as [thirty or forty] 
distinct varieties of potato, and [five or ten varieties] of maize, 
on farms of little more than a hectare.”86  In the past, American 
laws covering plant varieties incorporated the notion of 
farmers’ rights in which farmers retained their freedom to 
engage in these important and traditional activities.87  
However, in August 1994 the U.S. Congress amended the Plant 
Variety Protection Act and removed the farmer’s exemption.88  
As a result, “it is now expressly illegal for farmers to sell or 
                                                          
 78. Id. 
 79. UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 2, at 107; Barton, supra note 68, at 6. 
 80. UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 2, at 107. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Lettington, supra note 13, at 13. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 24. 
 86. Id. 
 87. UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 2, at 107. 
 88. Pub. L. No. 103-349, § 10, 108 Stat. 3136, 3142 (1994) (amending 7 
U.S.C. § 2543). 
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save seeds from proprietary crop varieties without receiving 
permission from breeders and paying royalties.”89  Ironically, 
according to Professor Aoki, while the U.S. Patent Office in the 
“early 19th century began to collect and catalogue and make” 
seed freely available, by the early twenty-first century, the 
commodification of germplasm had transformed the U.S. patent 
office, into a “primary means” of attacking the longstanding 
“practice of farmer seed-saving.”90  Grassroots activists are 
convinced that American industries are seeking these same 
results through TRIPS by pushing a particular interpretation 
of sui generis protection under Article 27.3(b).91 
Ultimately, TRIPS restricted the patenting of life forms, 
but Article 27.3(b) requires that members provide intellectual 
property protection for plant varieties or an “effective sui 
generis” system.92 However, there really is no consensus on 
what a sui generis system needs to include.  Additionally, the 
negotiations leading to the adoption of Article 27 provide little 
guidance because they provide no record on the meaning of sui 
generis.93  American plant breeders have been pushing the 
UPOV as the model sui generis system.  American support of 
UPOV may be due in part to how generous UPOV is to the 
corporate plant breeder.94  Fifty-one countries, many of which 
are industrialized, have joined the UPOV, which was last 
amended in 1991.95  The 1978 version of UPOV provided two 
limitations on the monopoly rights of plant breeders.96  First, 
other breeders could freely use UPOV-protected varieties for 
research purposes.97  Second, farmers could reuse the seed for 
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the following year’s harvest under certain conditions.98  The 
1991 revision narrowed down the exemption for competing 
breeders, deleted the so-called farmers’ privilege, and extended 
the breeders’’ monopoly right to the products of the farmer’s 
harvest.99  “Although the UPOV system allows on-farm 
replanting, its rules restrict farmers’ freedom to buy seed from 
sources other than the original breeders.”100  UPOV91 “does not 
authorize farmers to sell or exchange seeds with other farmers 
for propagating purposes.”101  To join UPOV today, nations 
must sign the 1991 treaty.102  Countries eschewing the UPOV 
system can adopt sui generis systems of protection that allow 
“farmers to acquire . . . protected seed from any source and/or 
requiring protected varieties to display qualities that are 
genuinely superior to existing varieties.”103 
In a comparative study of smallholder farming in Peru and 
Kenya, Robert J. L. Lettington did not find evidence that plant 
variety protection (PVP) legislation harmed smallholder 
agriculture.104  However, he argued that “the current system of 
PVP [legislation] is failing to create solutions to existing 
problems.”105  In particular, PVP legislation has created 
incentives that direct resources away from subsistence farmers’ 
needs in favor of those of large commercial agricultural 
enterprises.106 It also promotes the use of commercial seed as 
opposed to landraces or “wild” cultivars.107  “The end result has 
been a hastening of the deterioration of food security in these 
areas . . . .”108  Professor Lettington suggests that governments 
that seek to limit the cost of seed in economically and 
climatically marginal areas may “need to place limits on the 
nature of intellectual property rights.”109 
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IV. THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 
In examining the regulatory environment in this context, 
the central question is what degree of discretion states have in 
limiting intellectual property rights to support smallholder 
agriculture.  There are at least two dimensions to the answer: 
one addresses the letter of the law, the other addresses the 
broader context of asymmetrical power. Focusing on the formal 
features of intellectual property law, texts, and institutions, 
one sees plenty of room for state discretion and flexibility in 
adapting the global minimum standards to local concerns.110  
However, this formal universe is embedded in a system of 
asymmetrical power relationships and global capitalism that 
constrain weaker states’ abilities to exploit the flexibilities 
crafted into the law.111 
TRIPS provides substantial flexibility for developing 
countries.112  Article 27.3(b) specifies that countries may adopt 
an “effective sui generis system” to protect plant varieties.113  
Under TRIPS, countries may adopt patent protection for plant 
varieties, UPOV91, an alternative sui generis system, or some 
combination of these forms of protection.114 While corporate 
plant breeders would prefer that developing countries adopt 
UPOV91 as their domestic legislative standard, these countries 
are by no means required to do so.115  The UPOV treaties are 
one type of sui generis protection designed to serve the 
interests of plant breeders.  In a searching and thorough 
analysis of developing countries’ options, Professor Laurence 
Helfer has arrayed the options on a spectrum ranging from 
maximum discretion to minimal discretion for developing 
countries to tailor their systems to meet their particular 
needs.116  States that adopt TRIPS and ratify or accede to 
UPOV91 have the least discretion.117  According to Professor 
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Helfer, states wishing to retain maximum flexibility and 
discretion to serve the needs of smallholder agriculture would 
be well-advised to adopt TRIPS only.118 
The advantages of TRIPS are that its provisions on plant 
varieties “do not refer to or incorporate any preexisting 
intellectual property agreements, including the 1978 and 1991 
UPOV Acts.”119  TRIPS members are neither required “to 
become members of UPOV nor to enact national laws 
consistent with either UPOV Act in order to comply with their 
obligations under TRIP[S].”120  Article 27.3(b) preserves 
“significant leeway for national governments to work out the 
precise manner in which they will balance protection of IPRs 
against other international obligations and national 
objectives.”121  “The chances are, that for a poor nation, neither 
a UPOV nor a regular patent approach will actually encourage 
private-sector research.  Hence, such a nation is probably best-
off adopting minimum compliance with TRIPS . . . .”122  TRIPS, 
unlike UPOV91, preserves the right of subsistence farmers to 
exchange seed.123  For a nation in which the exchange is an 
issue, it would be wise to incorporate both subsistence farmer 
exemptions and research exemptions in national plant 
breeders’ rights legislation.124  Countries wishing to adopt the 
stronger UPOV91 system should consider incorporating 
waivers or exemptions for subsistence and smallholder 
farmers.125  In countries lacking significant private sector 
competition, as is often the case in poor countries, public sector 
seed provision will be important to promote competition to 
stimulate both variety and lower prices.126 
Public-private partnerships in agriculture might stimulate 
the transfer of technology so that public sector seed providers 
could adapt technology to subsistence farmers’ needs.127  In 
order for such arrangements to work, private firms would need 
to retain opportunities to capture economic benefits in the 
market sector, while keeping the technology affordable for the 
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subsistence sector.128  This two-tiered arrangement has some 
parallels in the control of access to medicines and would 
require safeguards against diverting subsistence-priced 
technology into the market sector.129 
Focusing on TRIPS and the letter of the law, one can 
conclude, as does Professor Helfer, that: 
States that implement the four core TRIP[S] requirements in good 
faith – that is, states that grant breeders intellectual property rights 
and enforcement measures applicable to varieties in all species and 
botanical genera and that provide those same rights and measures to 
breeders from other TRIP[S] member states – are unlikely to have 
their laws challenged successfully.130 
However, public international law such as TRIPS is 
embedded in a broader context of asymmetrical power 
relationships between developed and developing countries, and 
between producers and consumers of the fruits of 
biotechnology. This context reduces the amount of leeway that 
poor states have in devising regulatory approaches most 
suitable for their individual needs and stages of 
development.131  In particular, developing countries 
increasingly have been subject to bilateral and regional 
pressure to surrender the flexibilities afforded by TRIPS.132  
Bilateral investment treaties, bilateral intellectual property 
agreements, and regional free trade agreements concluded 
between the United States and developing countries and 
between the European Union and developing countries 
invariably have been considered to be “TRIPS-Plus.”133  For 
example, in the intellectual property provisions covering 
agriculture in the Central American Free Trade Agreement 
framework, developing countries are most often required to 
ratify or accede to UPOV91 as their sui generis system of 
protection and “to undertake ‘all reasonable efforts’ to make 
patent protection available for plants.”134 
Furthermore, developing countries have failed to take full 
advantage of TRIPS flexibilities not only in the agricultural 
marketplace, but the pharmaceutical market as well. This is 
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largely because such nations are eager to attract foreign 
investment and are concerned about alienating potential 
investors.135 They also are eager to have access to technologies 
that may aid in their development, provide reliable nutrition, 
and which have the potential to address a myriad of pressing 
social and economic problems.136 Most of these countries lack 
significant bargaining leverage and the capacity to resist the 
high-pressure tactics of the United States Trade 
Representative and the industries that it represents.137 
In these circumstances it is imperative that public 
institutions take the lead in assisting developing countries in 
the implementation of suitable legislation that conforms to 
their international legal obligations.  Public institutions, such 
as land grant universities, must also continue to make the 
fruits of their research available to those who need it most on 
terms that the recipients accept.  The 1980 Bayh-Dole Act 
allowed “grantees to seek patent rights in government-
sponsored research results.”138  The idea behind this was that 
many inventions with commercial potential lay fallow in 
university laboratories, and that patenting opportunities would 
give universities incentives to search research labs for 
significant and marketable inventions.139  The Bayh-Dole Act 
has resulted in at least a ten-fold increase of university 
patenting activity since 1979.140  This flurry of patenting 
activity has had the beneficial effect of generating revenue for 
cash-strapped public universities.  For instance, the patent 
infringement award that the University of Minnesota won for 
the development of the drug Ziagen has provided much-needed 
funding for research and graduate student support.141  
University patent portfolios also help to attract private sector 
funding, especially in biotechnology.142 
However, the Bayh-Dole Act also has created new divisions 
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within universities. As Professors Arti Rai and Rebecca 
Eisenberg point out, the legislation makes no distinction 
between upstream and downstream research, and as a result, 
an increasing number of research tools have become patent-
protected.143  An unintended consequence of the Bayh-Dole Act 
has been the dramatic reduction of open access to research 
tools.144  Technology transfer offices are charged with patenting 
and licensing technology to generate revenue for the 
institution.  Research scientists are more interested in having 
access to “open science.”145  The Bayh-Dole Act also has 
increased university collaboration with private sector 
biotechnology firms, raising many questions about academic 
freedom, research priorities, and incentives.146  Some critics 
have gone so far as to assert that universities have lost their 
sense of “public mission.”147 
Yet the choices may not be so stark, and there may be ways 
to navigate the contours of the current system to better balance 
competing imperatives.  For example, in the pharmaceutical 
sector, there could be clauses in agreements to allow a 
university to sublicense to generic manufacturers if its patent 
conflicts with efforts to distribute affordable drugs for 
HIV/AIDS victims in sub-Saharan Africa.148  Professors Rai 
and Eisenberg offer a similarly modest and sensible suggestion 
for publicly-funded research.  They suggest that “decisions 
about the dividing line between the public domain and private 
property should be made by institutions that are in a position 
to appreciate the tensions between widespread access and 
preservation of commercial incentives without being unduly 
swayed by institutional interests that diverge from the overall 
public interest.”149  In other words, they argue that public 
funding agencies should decide what fruits of their investments 
to patent.150  They also advocate addressing the 
upstream/downstream research tool issue by devising “a 
system that distinguishes cases in which proprietary claims 
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make sense from cases in which they do not.”151  Research tool 
exemptions would be useful to help to preserve the domain of 
“open science.” 
V. CONCLUSION 
This brief overview of some major issues involved in 
intellectual property protection and agricultural biotechnology 
underscores the fact that “the institution of property is 
extremely complex, and more importantly, political.”152  Yet we 
are no closer to resolving these controversies.  “More often than 
not, rather than being an answer, the issue of property rights is 
only the beginning of a long series of vexing questions.”153  
Developing countries should do what they can to preserve their 
autonomy in adopting intellectual property policies that suit 
their levels of development.  They should resist TRIPS-plus 
initiatives in bilateral and regional trade and investment 
agreements and insist upon TRIPS as their maximum 
standard.  Developing nations should seek technical assistance 
that encourages them to use existing TRIPS flexibilities.  They 
also need to participate in global standard-setting exercises 
concerning competition policy and address the ways in which 
they would prefer to regulate foreign firms’’ acquisition of local 
firms.154 
Promoting genuine competition is an important policy 
objective.  “Nations in which there is limited private sector 
competition in the seed industry should ensure that public 
sector varieties are available in competition with private sector 
ones.”155  Professor Lettington recommends: 
The activities of smallholder farmers, in particular the saving, use, 
exchange, and sale of farm-saved seed, should be explicitly stated as 
not subject to the rights of intellectual property rights holders. In 
accordance with the purposes and objectives of TRIPS, effort should 
be made to develop effective incentives for research targeted at 
smallholder farmers...... . Limited exceptions to intellectual property 
rights should be permitted to promote the adaptation of protected 
products to the needs of smallholder farmers. These should apply to 
both research and development and to manufacturing and 
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distribution.156 
Universities may feel caught between the conflicting 
imperatives of attracting private sector funding and generating 
revenue through patenting activity on the one hand, and 
promoting public goods through “humanitarian intellectual 
property” policies on the other.  It is clear that universities 
have an important role to play in preserving the balance 
between exclusion and access as well as paving the way to more 
informed, effective, and socially responsible agricultural 
intellectual property policies.  
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